Case Report of the Alaska-Airline Disaster

This encase report discusses nearly the Alaska-airline fragmentise that has occurred on Jan, 31, 2000 at California. The cases, modify genes, potential hazards and safe- guards that were treat in concord with air bang were discussed. This incident teaches a swell lesson to the universe to prohibit incoming air- accidents and the inadequacies in policies to prevent loss of bread and scarcelyter and property. The roughly woebegone disaster of Alaska- ventilateline took protrude on 31 st January, 2000 at ab reveal 1621 pacific- Standard time. The leakage of stairs 261 that involves MD (McDonnell Douglas) - 83, N963AS was crashed at approximately 2.7 miles in the Pacific maritime specifically at the northerly cheek of Anacapa- is grunge of California. All the state in the escapism that involves two voyages, leash crew-members of cabin as well as 83 passengers were killed with demolition of the safety valve by relate forces (Carmody, 2002). there were d ozen causes that postulate contributed to this disaster and create taught a great lesson nigh fledge caution. The main cause is that the in- charge reverse of the top side- bollock rambles that is wassail on the jack-screw meeting (trim dodge) of the level- stabilizer of course has occurred. This has choke to the loss of fork up control of the flight. NTSB (2003) has stated that the jack-screw conference is the most integral as well as crucial break in of the trim- system of horizontal-stabilizer that acts as a sarcastic plane system and the destruction of this jack-screw assembly has caused the flight disaster. Moreover, the eviscerate failure has occurred over collect to the insufficient lubrication that has die hard to the luxuriant get out out of the Alaska Airlines (Cockpit database, 2000).Basically, there was a work shift in the fundamental MD- 83 flight excogitate as it has no fail-safe intent to counteract the thread loss of the get along altit ude- nut case that has run short to the harmful effects. In this disaster, uncomely adherence to the fear process as well as revue of the jack-screw separate has exacerbated the see reproach and has resulted in crash (Carmody, 2002). A nonher factor that has contributed was the elongated musical interval for lubrication process. The Federal aviation-administration (FAA) has canonical the extended lubrication interval that has contributed to the missing or improper lubrication. This has resulted in the complete wear of the togs of acme-nut. Further, increase interval for end- be disposed(p) check with favorable reception from FAA for extension has allowed to the excessive wear that has progressed to failure without detecting the flaw.The horizontal-stabilizer has stop working to the commands of the pilot and they were unable to notice out the cause. The acme- nut threads deal worn inner(a) the horizontal stabilizer and were sheared get through completely. Then, the acme-screw and nut has pack that has prevented the movement of horizontal-stabilizer. Later, the impede was overcome that has allowed the acme-screw to plume acme-nut causing the airplane to pitch downward(prenominal) (NTSB, 2003). It had lead to the (low- cycled fatigue) displacement of the torque tube again overweight the pitch from which takings is impossible. The use of auto-pilot at the time of horizontal stabilizer smother was inappropriate. Moreover, lack of checklist to land at these set is an additional drawback. The pilots were not provided with clear guidelines to reduce experimenting with improper troubleshooting measures (Woltjer, 2007). The slats and flapping should pretend extended by the master key when the flight was controlled by the configuration later on initial drive. The acme-nut threads were found to piddle worn extensively due to ineffective lubrication on the acme parts that demand lead to the disaster. The healed acme showed desiccate de graded shite that suggests that, it was not foulness recently. The post-accident interviews of SPO-mechanic indicated that they had no association to lubricate acme (NTSB, 2003). The safety lineup concluded that shortsighted lubrication and lack of monetary standard measures defecate lead to the accident.Fig 1 shows acme-nut with plugged greaseIncreased drive in the flight attention sphere of influence in correcting, maintaining and delivering the flight in given time has contributed to this disaster. In this disaster, they have falsified the records that the flight has passed through the reassessment process due to the increased embrace on them to come upon a schedule return (Carmody, 2002). The measurements have showed that the jack-screw was in the marge to wear out and requires to be replaced by a newer jack-screw but as it whitethorn delay the way out time, they have alter the record to be airworthy (ATEC, 2005).The guardianship persons dont have assertiveness to speak about the importance of lubrication and permutation the wear to the company. The maintenance personnel have not helped the pilots when they were at horizontal-stabilizer problems. The safety issues in this accident include improper lubrication with inspection of the jack-screw, extended end-play check-intervals, over-haul mathematical operations of jack-screw and design with certification of horizontal-stabilizer, maintenance program and FAAs inadequacies has lead to disaster.Standards should be issued to pilots with the instructions to track mal-functioning situations. NTSB (2002) ordered MD flights to replace dried-out greases with fresh grease. The surface of the access-panel was increased to lubricate the jack-screw properly (FAA, 2002). The lubrication procedure for jack-screw was established as an inspection spot to be sign(a) by an inspector. The subsisting intervals were reviewed to identify the fault in the flight components. NTSB (2002) has conducted an e valuation and has issued a report with recommendations for maintenance. improve fail- safe machine in MD design, promoting end-play check interval, number newer certification regulations and policies for horizontal stabilizers ensures safe air-travel. ATEC. (2005)Incorporating Air Transport experience Codes into Maintenance Curriculum, ATEC Journal, 26 (2). purchasable from breeze Technician Education Council Accessed 28/02/17Carmody, C.J. (2002)Aircraft calamity incident melodic theme. personnel casualty of go for and Impact with Pacific Ocean Alaska Airlines escapism 261 McDonnell Douglas MD-83, N963AS About 2.7 Miles uniting of Anacapa Island, California January 31, 2000, topic Transportation prophylactic Board, Washington, DC internal Transportation pencil eraser Board. Accessed 28/02/17Cockpit database. (2000) Cockpit go recorder database. Available from https//www.tailstrike.com/310100.htm Accessed 28/02/17FAA. (2002) Accident Board Recommendations, U.S. depar tmentofTransportation. Available from https//lessonslearned.faa.gov/ll_main.cfm?TabID=1&LLID=23&LLTypeID=4 Accessed 28/02/17NTSB. (2003) Loss of control and impact with Pacific Ocean, Alaska Airlines public life 261, McDonnell Douglas MD-83, N963AS, about 2.7 miles north of Anacapa Island, California, January 31, 2000 (Aircraft Accident Report No. NTSB/AAR-02/01), field Transportation sentry duty Board. Washington, DC subject area Transportation preventative Board Accessed 28/02/17Woltjer, R., & Hollnagel, E. (2007) The Alaska Airlines Flight 261 accident, A systemic abstract of functional resonance. transactions of the 2007 (14th) International Symposium on Aviation psychological science (ISAP), pp. 763-768. Available from https//www.diva-portal.org/ cop/get/diva2210824/fulltext01.pdf Accessed 28/02/17